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Introduction
Following the enlargements of the European Union in 2004 and 2007, there 
was a fear amongst trade unions and workers in ‘old’ member states that 
large numbers of Central and Eastern European workers and enterprises 
would avail themselves of their free movement rights under EU law in order 
to engage in ‘social dumping’. As a result, all ‘old’ member states apart 
from Ireland, Sweden and the UK initially restricted access to their labour 
markets for workers from those countries that joined the EU in 2004 (with 
the exception of Cyprus and Malta). The same happened in 2007 when all 
‘old’ member states apart from Sweden and Finland imposed limitations on 
the rights of Bulgarian and Romanian workers to move to their territories. 
The enlargements, taken together, are unprecedented in the history of the 
European Union. Never had so many accession countries been admitted into 
the European Union within such a short period of time. In addition, there 
were large income differences between workers in old and new member states. 
In terms of labour law, a majority of the ten Central and Eastern European 
countries which acceded in 2004 and 2007 combined weak domestic labour 
protection systems with a high proportion of skilled workers and enterprises 
willing and keen to move. All of these factors placed an enormous strain on the 
European Union’s institutions and structures. Much was written, immediately 
following the event, on the impact of the enlargements on the European 
Union, its member states and non-state actors such as trade unions. However, 
the current economic crisis which started in 2008 has led to a shift in focus 
away from the social problems that faced the EU and its member states in the 
immediate wake of the enlargements. Nonetheless, there is a pressing need 
to address recent developments which have taken place following and as a 
result of the European enlargements, and to assess the impact of the economic 
FULVLVRQWKH(XURSHDQ6RFLDO0RGHO7KLV:RUNLQJ3DSHUWDNHVD¿UVWVWHSLQ
this direction by considering the effects of the economic crisis on an enlarged 
EU and its Social Model taking into account the lasting impact of the recent 
enlargements.
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1. The economic crisis
7KHFXUUHQWHFRQRPLFFULVLVWKHELJJHVW¿QDQFLDODQGHFRQRPLFGRZQWXUQVLQFH
the Great Depression, has its origins in the bursting of the American housing 
bubble and the consequent collapse of the sub-prime mortgage market in the 
United States in 2007 and 2008. In the years leading up to the peak of the 
housing bubble, a growing number of mortgage loans were made available to 
borrowers who did not meet banks’ prime lending criteria. In many cases, the 
original lenders which had advanced these ‘sub-prime’ loans no longer bore 
the economic risk that borrowers might default on their loans. This risk had 
been externalised by means of securitisation, whereby mortgage loans were 
packaged together into loan portfolios and sold to special purpose vehicles, 
which then used the loans as collateral for the issue of securities (i.e. debt 
instruments). Secondary markets enabled the original purchasers of these debt 
LQVWUXPHQWVWRVHOOWKHPRQWRRWKHU¿QDQFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQVDQGLQYHVWRUVOHDGLQJ
to the international trade in such securities. As the housing bubble burst, sub-
prime borrowers increasingly found themselves unable to meet the repayment 
obligations under their mortgage loans. With the fall in house prices, the 
proportion of borrowers in negative equity increased and, accordingly, the full 
value of non-performing loans could no longer be recovered by enforcement and 
IRUHFORVXUH7KHFRQVHTXHQWVKRUWIDOOPHDQWWKDWWKHUHZDVLQVXI¿FLHQWLQFRPH
to satisfy the claims under debt instruments which were issued on the back of 
sub-prime mortgages. The holders of such securities were left high and dry, along 
with those institutions which had sold protection against the risk of default in the 
form of credit derivatives. The ever-growing number of defaults in the sub-prime 
mortgage market and the global proliferation of mortgage-backed securities led 
to uncertainty amongst banks as to the exposure of their counterparties to such 
toxic assets. As a result of this climate of fear, banks stopped lending to each 
RWKHUWKXVOHDGLQJWRDVKRUWDJHRIOLTXLGLW\7KRVH¿QDQFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQVZKRVH
business models were predicated on the assumption that they would always be 
able to satisfy their liquidity requirements by tapping the wholesale markets, 
such as UK lender Northern Rock, were hit particularly hard by the sudden 
disappearance of interbank lending. The resultant doubts as to the solvency of 
1RUWKHUQ 5RFN EURXJKW DERXW WKH ¿UVW UXQ RQ D %ULWLVK EDQN LQ PRUH WKDQ D
century, as customers sought to withdraw their deposits in expectation of the 
bank going under. As the Robert Schumann Centre (Paulo 2011) explains in 
DEULH¿QJ WKHFULVLVSHDNHG LQ WKHDXWXPQRIZKHQWKH86JRYHUQPHQW
decided not to save the investment bank Lehman Brothers. Previously, the 
$PHULFDQ VWDWH KDG GHFLGHG WR EDLO RXW VHYHUDO ¿QDQFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQV VXFK DV
Bear Sterns, an investment bank, and the mortgage agencies, Freddie Mac and 
Fannie Mae. The decision to do otherwise in the case of Lehman Brothers further 
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GHVWDELOLVHG WKH ZRUOG¶V ¿QDQFLDO PDUNHWV DQG JRYHUQPHQWV LQ WKH 86 DQG
Europe had to step in to provide emergency funding for banks in their countries, 
to guarantee investments, to provide hefty stimulus packages for their economies 
DQG LQ VRPH FDVHV WR QDWLRQDOLVH IDLOLQJ LQVWLWXWLRQV 7KH ¿QDQFLDO FULVLV LQ
turn developed into a global economic crisis as global GDP contracted in 2009. 
This global recession considerably reduced public revenues and placed a heavy 
burden on welfare states. In addition, governments in most developed countries 
were burdened with costly rescue packages from bailing out banks in the wake of 
WKH¿QDQFLDOFULVLVDQGKDGWRLQLWLDWHGHHSVSHQGLQJFXWVDQGDXVWHULW\PHDVXUHV
LQRUGHUWRUHGXFHWKHLUSXEOLFGH¿FLW$WWKHVDPHWLPHPDUNHWFRQ¿GHQFHLQ
sovereign debt faltered as investors and rating agencies began to doubt the 
creditworthiness of certain countries in the euro-zone –  notably, Portugal, 
Ireland, Greece and Spain. The downgrading of such countries’ credit ratings 
had the effect of raising interest rates for those countries, making it harder for 
them to service their debt. 
In October 2009, Greece admitted that it was no longer able to pay its creditors 
and, in February 2010 , the country was placed under budgetary supervision by 
the European Commission. European leaders, together with the Commission 
and the International Monetary Fund have since agreed a number of rescue 
packages for Greece in exchange for the reform and stabilisation of Greece’s 
SXEOLF¿QDQFHV+RZHYHUWKLVGLGQRWFDOPPDUNHWVDQGE\2FWREHUDPLGVW
political turmoil in Greece, euro-zone leaders and the IMF came to an agreement 
with private lenders to write off part of Greece’s debt. The opposition amongst 
the Greek public to the austerity measures led to the collapse of government in 
October 2011 and the formation of a unity government. Nonetheless, it remains 
to be seen whether Greek politicians will be able to force through further 
austerity measures which are required by the international community as a 
condition of the rescue. In November 2010 , Ireland was forced to draw on the 
¿QDQFLDOVXSSRUWRIWKH(XURSHDQ)LQDQFLDO6WDELOLW\)DFLOLW\LQRUGHUWRVHUYLFH
its debts. Portugal followed in May 2011 and there is a fear that Spain and even 
,WDO\PD\QHHGWRUHO\RQ¿QDQFLDOVXSSRUWLQRUGHUWRPHHWWKHLUGHEWUHSD\PHQW
obligations. In parallel, the euro-zone crisis has created deep rifts between 
European member states. Within the eurozone, Germany and France have taken 
a strong lead in pushing for greater integration of euro-zone economies. This 
culminated in a meeting of European leaders in Brussels in December 2011 at 
which David Cameron, the UK Prime Minister, was the only European leader 
to refuse to agree to a change in the EU Treaty which would have provided for 
deeper integration around tax and budget powers of member state governments. 
7KHUHPDLQLQJPHPEHUVWDWHVVLJQHGWKHLURZQ¿VFDOSDFWWKHSUHFLVHGHWDLOV
of which are yet to be determined. 
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2. European dimension
The economic crisis has also had a profound effect on the EU’s Social Model 
which has developed since the early 1990s. The heads of state at the Nice 
European Council described the European Social Model in the following terms:
‘The European social model, characterized in particular by systems that offer a 
high level of social protection, by the importance of the social dialogue and by 
services of general interest covering activities vital for social cohesion, is today 
based […] on a common core of values. […] It now includes essential texts in 
numerous areas: free movement of workers, gender equality at work, health and 
safety of workers, working and employment conditions and, more recently, the 
¿JKWDJDLQVWDOOIRUPVRIGLVFULPLQDWLRQ¶
However, this description of the content of the Model does not fully explain its 
nature. There has been a long-standing debate as to whether the European Social 
Model really exists and, if so, what its role is. It is often stated, for example, 
that the European Social Model ‘is not really a model, it is not only social, and 
it is not particularly European’ (Diamantopoulou 2003). In contrast, Vaughan-
Whitehead (2003) recognises the existence of a European Social Model but lists 
FRXQWOHVVFULWHULDWKDWLWPXVWIXO¿OLQRUGHUWRFRXQWDVVXFK$QXPEHURIPRUH
general arguments are also often put forward when discussing the existence, or 
RWKHUZLVHRID(XURSHDQ6RFLDO0RGHO)LUVWLWLVLPSRVVLEOHWRGH¿QHD(XURSH
wide social model. Every member state has its own system which has developed 
YDU\LQJVWDQGDUGV LQVWLWXWLRQVDQGVWUXFWXUHV$OEHU,W LVWKXVGLI¿FXOW
WRGH¿QHD(XURSHDQQRUPDQG6RFLDO0RGHO6HFRQGO\HYHQZKHUH(XURSHDQ
standards exist, these are often implemented to varying degrees and in different 
ZD\VLQWKHPHPEHUVWDWHV,WLVWKHUHIRUHGLI¿FXOWWRVSHDNRIDFOHDUO\GH¿QHG
‘European Social Model’. 
However, the problem may not lie only with the availability of EU norms which 
PD\ RU PD\ QRW PDNH XS D (XURSHDQ 6RFLDO 0RGHO 5DWKHU WKH GLI¿FXOW\ LQ
GH¿QLWLRQPD\EHGXHWRWKHFULWHULDXVHG,WLVRIWHQDUJXHGWKDWWKH(XURSHDQ
Social Model cannot be compared with national social models which regulate 
a vast array of social matters. Instead, the European Social Model should be 
seen as a political tool which enables the EU to create minimum standards in 
those areas that fall within its competence. These minimum standards are meant 
to reduce competition between member states which should lead to further 
European integration. The hope of the EU is that, by combining economic and 
social welfare, the EU will achieve ‘stronger, lasting growth and the creation of 
more and better jobs’ (Commission Communication 2005). 
10 WP 2013.01
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The European institutions have adopted a key role in the development of the 
European Social Model. The European Community has enjoyed a limited amount 
RIFRPSHWHQFHLQWKH¿HOGRIODERXUODZVLQFHWKHDGRSWLRQRIWKH6LQJOH(XURSHDQ
Act in 1986. Apart from the provisions contained in the EU Treaties, which enable 
the EU institutions to act in order to facilitate the free movement of workers, 
article 153 TFEU allows for the introduction of directives on working conditions, 
information and consultation of workers, and equality at work between men and 
women. Limitations on legislative competence operate in other areas of labour 
law and, as an alternative, soft law techniques must be used. The European Union 
repeatedly took advantage of the Treaty provisions to legislate in a number of 
areas in order to achieve a certain degree of harmonisation in the areas of labour 
law and social policy across the member states. Particularly following the entry 
into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the European Commission, together 
with the social partners, pursued a social policy. However, Directive 2002/ 14/
EC establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in 
the European Community marked the culmination of almost a decade of active 
legislating in the area of social policy by the Commission and the social partners. 
Even though Directives on social policy are still sporadically negotiated, soft law 
mechanisms have, since 2002, taken over as the preferred method for achieving 
an approximation of labour standards across the EU. 
A number of reasons have been put forward for this shift towards soft-law 
mechanisms. Bercusson (2009: 554-555), for example, argues that the paucity of 
new ‘hard law’ is due to a lack of enthusiasm for social measures within the European 
Commission. According to this author, the Lisbon Agenda does not encourage 
further social developments. Weiss, on the other hand, lays the blame with the 
member states. His argument is that, following enlargement, the interests of the 27 
member states have become too diverse to negotiate effective social instruments. 
Ashiagbor (2004: 313) argues that ‘the resort to soft law [can be seen] as a means 
RI¿QGLQJDPLGGOHJURXQGEHWZHHQOHJDODQGSROLWLFDO LQWHUYHQWLRQV>ZKLFKLV@
particularly important whilst member states continue to be so reluctant to sanction 
further inroads into their sovereignty.’ In either case, the emphasis since 2002 has 
been on soft law mechanisms –  ‘framework agreements, joint declarations and 
guidelines and codes of conduct’ (Marginson 2006: 103) –  as a means of achieving 
some sort of harmonisation of national labour laws across the European Union. 
Moreover, there has been a growing emphasis on the Open Method of Coordination 
which has been described as a ‘means of spreading best practice and achieving 
greater convergence towards the main EU goals’ (Commission Communication 
2002). This method ‘combines processes of common target-setting by member 
states, cross-country benchmarking and periodic review’ (Marginson 2006: 103). 
The OMC originated in the context of the EU’s Employment Strategy, which 
is essentially ‘a coordinated and Commission-facilitated inter-governmental 
process’ (Marginson 2006: 103). Barnard and Deakin (2002) argue that the OMC 
can be seen as a way of regulatory intervention which attempts to provide space 
for experimentation in rule-making and to encourage regulatory learning through 
the exchange of best practice between different levels. Scott and Trubek (2002) 
explain that ‘the OMC aims to coordinate the actions of several member states in 
a given policy domain and to create conditions for mutual learning that hopefully 
will induce some degree of voluntary policy convergence.’
European enlargement and the economic crisis: impact and lasting efects
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The OMC can therefore be seen as ‘a response to regulatory failure, as well as a 
response to the ‘joint decision trap’ or the ‘competency gap’ in social policy and 
in other policy areas’ (Ashiagbor 2004: 318). As a form of governance, the OMC 
‘has the potential to achieve policy coordination without threatening jealously-
guarded national sovereignty, and to allow member states to implement policy in 
accordance with their socio-economic development’ (Ashiagbor 2004: 318). 
7KHUH DUH FRQÀLFWLQJ YLHZV RQ WKH HIIHFWLYHQHVV RI WKH 20& $GYRFDWHV RI WKH
method argue that ‘with an increasingly differentiated European Union, and in 
light of […] enlargement, the coordination approach is appealing, as it does not 
seek to establish a single common framework, but instead, to put the EU member 
states on a path towards achieving common objectives’ (De la Porte 2002: 39). 
Ashiagbor (2004: 319) suggests that the OMC ‘can provide an innovative regulatory 
strategy which in fact leads to more effective coordination of social policy, by 
SURYLGLQJDÀH[LEOHIUDPHZRUNLQZKLFKPHPEHUVWDWHVFDQDFKLHYHWKHDLPVRI
European social policy on their own terms.’ The characteristics often associated 
ZLWKWKH20&DUHWKHUHIRUHÀH[LELOLW\DGDSWDELOLW\DQGSHUYDVLYHQHVV5RGULJXH]
and Telo 2004).
Opponents of the OMC challenge its effectiveness and argue that it ‘impacts 
on domestic policy-making only when the European objectives coincide with 
the national policy objectives’ (De la Porte 2002: 50). Empirical research also 
demonstrates that the OMC tends frequently to be ineffective, particularly as there 
are no time constraints on implementation or enforcement mechanisms to ensure 
compliance. Moreover, according to one author (Hatzopoulos 2007: 318-319), the 
OMC may: 
‘damage the future legitimacy of the EU and its Institutions […] as it does not 
FRQIHU DQ\ QHZ FRPSHWHQFLHV RQ WKHP EXW VSHFL¿FDOO\ OLPLWV WKHLU UHDFK RQ
QDWLRQDO SROLFLHV LQ WKH ¿HOGV FRQFHUQHG 0RUH LPSRUWDQWO\ VWLOO WKHUH LV D ULVN
WKDWWKH20&UHSODFHVWKHFODVVLF&RPPXQLW\PHWKRGLQ¿HOGVZKHUHWKHODWWHU
currently prevails.’
7KH ODFN RI OHJLVODWLYH PHDVXUHV LQ WKH ¿HOG RI ODERXU ODZ VLQFH  VHHPV WR
FRQ¿UPVXFKVXVSLFLRQV
However, following the recent European enlargements, there is a pressing need 
for European initiatives to counter their negative effects. The underlying rationale 
for the European social policy has hitherto been the demand for broad equivalence 
in labour standards to minimise competition across member states. Following the 
European enlargements and the accession of ten Central and Eastern European 
States, with their differing labour relations systems, this task has become 
LQFUHDVLQJO\ GLI¿FXOW $V RQH DXWKRU FRPPHQWV 9DXJKDQ:KLWHKHDG 
two common features of the labour markets of the new member states are their 
relatively low levels of employment and productivity. They are thus prime targets 
for enterprises from old member states seeking to outsource or relocate labour-
intensive stages of production. Furthermore, most of the new member states of 
Central and Eastern Europe have adopted the liberal-individualist approach to 
social and welfare policies. This has gained ground without a development of 
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adequate social dialogue and worker representation. Yet, ‘from the perspective of 
the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe, this process [of relocation 
by enterprises], and that of the related migration of some of their workers to the 
old member states, are the means by which convergence on Western European 
levels of productivity and per capita income are achieved’ (Adnett & Hardy 2005: 
201).
The negative impact of this movement of enterprises and workers culminated 
in the Viking and Laval decisions of the European Court of Justice in 2007 and 
2008. In these cases, the ECJ  was asked to balance fundamental collective rights 
with the free movement provisions enshrined in the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union. 
In the Viking case, the English Court of Appeal referred a number of questions to 
the ECJ  regarding the extent to which trade unions are able to use industrial action 
to resist dumping in the EU. The facts of the case are relatively straightforward. 
Viking Line ABP (Viking), a ferry operator incorporated under Finnish law and 
running regular services on the route between Tallinn and Helsinki, sought in 
WRUHÀDJLWVYHVVHOE\UHJLVWHULQJLWLQ(VWRQLD7KHUHDVRQIRUWKLVZDVWKH
higher wages applicable under the terms of a collective agreement, governed by 
Finnish law, with the Finnish Seaman’s Union (the FSU) and which caused Viking 
to run its services at a loss on the above-mentioned route. In accordance with 
)LQQLVKODZ9LNLQJJDYHQRWLFHRILWVLQWHQWLRQVWRUHÀDJWRWKH)68ZKRRSSRVHG
the plans. Based on the ‘Flag of Convenience’ policy of the International Transport 
Workers’ Federation (ITF), the FSU requested that the ITF, whose headquarters 
ZDVLQ/RQGRQVHQGRXWDFLUFXODUDVNLQJLWVDI¿OLDWHVWRUHIUDLQIURPHQWHULQJLQWR
negotiations with Viking, which it duly did. Despite numerous negotiations, the 
ITF’s circular remained in force and prevented Viking from pursuing its intention 
RIUHÀDJJLQJLWVYHVVHO)ROORZLQJ(VWRQLD¶VDFFHVVLRQWRWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQLQ
2004, Viking brought an action before the High Court of Justice of England and 
Wales requesting it to declare the action taken by the ITF and the FSU contrary 
to the provisions on the free movement of establishment contained in the TFEU; 
to order the withdrawal of the ITF’s circular; and to order the FSU not to infringe 
the rights enjoyed by Viking under EU law. The court granted the order on 16 June 
2005 on the grounds that the actual and threatened collective action constituted 
a restriction on freedom of establishment. However, this was appealed by the 
ITF and the FSU who claimed, inter alia, that the right of trade unions to take 
collective action to preserve jobs is a fundamental right recognised by Title X of 
the TFEU. Before deciding the case before it, the Court of Appeal referred to the 
ECJ  a number of questions pertaining to, inter alia, the relationship between 
social rights such as the right to take collective action, and the rights on freedom of 
movement guaranteed by the Treaty.
While the ECJ  accepted that the right to take collective action must be regarded as a 
fundamental right forming an integral part of EU law, it ruled that this right may be 
subject to restrictions. In particular, the exercise of the fundamental right must be 
reconciled with the requirements of the Treaty. In attempting such reconciliation, 
regard must be had to the principle of proportionality. Leading on from this, the 
Court considered whether the restriction on freedom of establishment by the FSU 
European enlargement and the economic crisis: impact and lasting efects
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DQGWKH,7)LQWKLVFDVHFRXOGEHMXVWL¿HG7KH&RXUWHODERUDWHGRQWKHEDODQFH
to be struck between the right to collective action and freedom of establishment. 
The collective action must pursue a legitimate aim compatible with the Treaty and 
EH MXVWL¿HG E\ RYHUULGLQJ UHDVRQV RI SXEOLF LQWHUHVW )XUWKHUPRUH DFFRUGLQJ WR
settled case law, the restriction would have to be proportionate to the objectives 
being pursued. The ECJ  left it up to the national court to consider whether the 
FROOHFWLYHDFWLRQFRXOGEHMXVWL¿HGLQWKLVFDVH
The Laval case originated in May 2004, when Laval un Partneri (‘Laval’), a Riga-
based company incorporated under Latvian law, posted workers to Sweden in line 
with Directive 96/ 71 on the posting of workers (‘the Posted Workers Directive’) to 
work on building sites operated by a Swedish company. In June 2004, Laval, on 
the one hand, and the Swedish building and public works trade union, Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet (‘Byggnadsarbetareförbundet’), on the other, began 
negotiations to determine the rates of pay for the posted workers contained in 
a collective agreement for the building sector. However, negotiations failed and 
Laval signed collective agreements with the Latvian building sector trade union, 
WRZKLFKD ODUJHPDMRULW\RI WKHSRVWHGZRUNHUVZHUHDI¿OLDWHG$VDUHVXOW WKH
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet established a blockade –  legal under Swedish law 
–  of all sites on which Laval was working in Sweden. In addition, the Swedish 
Electricians’ Union gave notice of sympathy action directed against electrical 
installation work at all the construction sites of the company in Sweden. This led 
to the posted workers being sent back to Latvia. 
Laval brought an action before the Labour Court against the unions, inter alia, for 
a declaration as to the unlawfulness of the collective action and for compensation 
for the loss suffered. In the course of the proceedings, the Labour Court decided 
to refer a number of questions to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary 
ruling in order to ascertain whether EC law precluded trade unions from taking 
collective action which hinders the free movement of services as protected under 
EC law. The ECJ  handed down its judgment on 18 th December 2007. 
The ECJ , at the outset, established the horizontal direct effect of the EC Treaty 
provisions on the free movement of services. It then went on to consider whether 
the collective action in the form of a blockade taken by trade unions in this case was 
compatible with the EC rules on the freedom to provide services and the prohibition 
of discrimination on the grounds of nationality. One aspect that the ECJ  discussed 
at length was the fact that in the host country the legislation implementing the 
Posted Workers Directive made no express provision for the application of terms 
and conditions of employment contained in collective agreements. The relevant 
collective agreement in this case provided for more favourable conditions than 
those envisaged by the directive. The ECJ , therefore, considered whether the 
FROOHFWLYHDFWLRQWDNHQZDVMXVWL¿DEOHLQOLJKWRILWVREMHFWLYHQDPHO\WRIRUFHD
service provider to grant more favourable conditions to its workers than those 
prescribed by EC law. 
The ECJ  found that the host member state may not make the movement of the 
service provider subject to more restrictive conditions than national service 
providers. A member state may thus apply its legislation or collective agreements 
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to the service provider as long as the application of these rules is appropriate for 
securing the protection of workers and does not go beyond what is necessary for 
the attainment of the objective. The Posted Workers Directive lays down a level of 
PLQLPXPSURWHFWLRQWKHH[DFWFRQWHQWRIZKLFKPD\EHGH¿QHGE\WKHLQGLYLGXDO
member states. However, the ECJ  did not accept the method of implementation 
of the Posted Workers Directive in Sweden where the applicable rates of pay were 
negotiated on a case-by-case basis through the social partners, without being 
supplemented by legislation providing for universal applicability, as this led to a 
climate of unfair competition between national and posted service providers. In 
addition, the ECJ  pointed out that the right of collective action which may be used 
to force foreign service providers to sign collective agreements is liable to make 
WKHSURYLVLRQRIVHUYLFHVE\WKRVHSURYLGHUVPRUHGLI¿FXOWDQGOHVVDWWUDFWLYH LQ
the host member state. The action thus constituted a restriction on the freedom to 
provide services and was unlawful.
Both judgments have been heavily criticised by labour lawyers and trade unionists 
across Europe. The cases were referred to the ECJ  amidst a climate of fear amongst 
workers in old member states that the presence on their labour markets of new 
member state workers whose wage demands are often lower would lead to a race 
to the bottom. As mentioned above, the social policy of the European Union has 
traditionally aimed to establish a threshold of rights for workers in the hope of 
broadly approximating labour standards across the member states and, in turn, 
eliminating unfair competition. However, a situation of ‘disparities in wages and 
working conditions among the member states, exacerbated by the accession of new 
member states, has led to challenges which have yet to be accommodated by EU 
law’ (Bercusson 2009: 656). This is coupled with the fact that the ‘commitment to 
harmonisation is in decline and there has been a growing emphasis on promoting 
a European social model by softer means’ (Davies 2006: 85). The Viking and 
Laval judgments did little to alleviate the fear of trade unions that they would be 
unable to protect their members from the occurrence of social dumping following 
the European enlargements. 
The Viking case was eventually settled out of court. However, the Laval case 
returned to the Swedish Labour Court that had referred the question to the ECJ . 
The Labour Court, in December 2009, applied EC law principles on state liability to 
SULYDWHSDUWLHVLQRUGHUWR¿QGDWUDGHXQLRQOLDEOHIRUGDPDJHVIRUWDNLQJXQODZIXO
collective action. This revived the fear amongst labour lawyers and trade unionists 
that national collective labour law systems and the European Social Model were 
under threat following the European enlargements. While there is an urgent 
need for action at a European level to clarify the effects and scope of the ECJ’s 
judgments, little has been forthcoming so far and the ongoing economic crisis 
seems to have delayed any prospects for action in addition to creating additional 
problems for the European Social Model.
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3. The efects of the crisis and the need  
 for action
As one observer (Van Reisen et al.SRLQWVRXW µLQFUHDVLQJ¿QDQFLDO
deregulation and privatisation has put the European Social Model under threat. 
[…] The economic recession resulting from the crisis further threatens Europe’s 
approach to social welfare.’ At a national level, spending cuts to reduce public 
GH¿FLWVKDYHHQWDLOHGDUHGXFWLRQLQVRFLDOZHOIDUHDQGSXEOLFVHUYLFHV&RQWLQXHG
low growth rates have led to some of the highest levels of unemployment in 
the EU member states since the Second World War. However, at a European 
level the response has mainly focussed on recovery plans and rescue packages 
WDUJHWHGDWWKH¿QDQFLDOVHFWRU7KHUDWLRQDOHEHKLQGVXFKVXSSRUWLVWKDWµVWDWH
guarantees and recapitalisations will allow banks to make more loans available, 
thus stimulating an increase in investment, which is expected to create and 
maintain jobs’ (Van Reisen et al. 2009: 44). However, this policy has also 
been criticised by many as ignoring the widening social inequalities which are 
developing in the member states. There have been calls for the EU to adopt 
‘measures to integrate those who are excluded from the labour market, invest in 
social and health services and improve social protection systems’ (Van Reisen 
et al. 2009: 44). Although the EU institutions have the competence under the 
Treaty to adopt minimum standards in the area of labour law and social policy, 
there has been no talk of adopting hard law mechanisms in order to ease the 
effects of the crisis. Even within the Open Method of Coordination, initiatives 
within the social sphere have declined considerably (Pochet 2008). So far, 
the EU has restricted itself to ‘developing guidelines on the design of labour 
market policies during the crisis’ (Commission 2009). Indeed, a summit of EU 
OHDGHUVZKLFKZDVVXSSRVHGWR¿QGDUHVROXWLRQIRUWKHJURZLQJXQHPSOR\PHQW
problem as a result of the crisis was postponed in order to avoid false promises 
being made in the run-up to the European Parliament elections in 2009 (Labaki 
2009). While a summit was held in February 2010 , it focussed mainly on the 
Greek debt crisis rather than the social issues facing the member states (Illmer 
2010). 
The EU institutions have also stressed the importance of the Lisbon Strategy 
and of Europe 2020  in responding to the economic crisis. The Lisbon Strategy, 
‘the EU’s strategy for creating growth and jobs in a sustainable manner’ between 
2000  and 2010 , if adhered to, ‘will help recovery by boosting demand and 
UHVWRULQJFRQ¿GHQFHLQWKH(XURSHDQHFRQRP\¶(PSOR\PHQWDQG6RFLDO$IIDLUV
2011). Following the replacement of the Lisbon Strategy with ‘Europe 2020’, the 
EU’s growth strategy from 2010  until 2020  was meant to have a double purpose: 
‘it should focus on how to overcome the crisis, and in the medium term, it should 
GH¿QH WKH (8¶V HFRQRPLF DQG VRFLDO PRGHO ZKLFK LV QHHGHG LQ RUGHU WR IDFH
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the challenges of globalisation’ (Presidency 2010). However, the ambit of the 
strategy is still unclear. 
The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC 2011) remains sceptical about 
the EU’s social response to the crisis and even goes so far as to suggest that ‘the 
current situation is unfortunately used as an opportunity by those neo-liberals 
who want our economies to be fully in the hands of the markets, to attack the 
European social model.’ Whether or not the ETUC’s assessment of the situation 
is correct, it certainly seems unfortunate that the EU is not availing itself of its 
legislative competences to use the crisis in order to strengthen the European 
Social Model. 
J udging by the current lack of initiative at an EU level, it seems that the 
European Social Model is itself in crisis. There have been almost no hard-law 
developments since 2002 and even the use of soft-law mechanisms has stalled. 
While the EU 2020  Strategy sets ambitious targets, little has been forthcoming 
LQWKHVRFLDOSROLF\¿HOGHYHQWKRXJKWKHHFRQRPLFFULVLVKDVKDGDPDMRULPSDFW
on employment and social welfare across the EU. Obviously, the pressing 
QHHG DW DQ (8 OHYHO LV WR ¿QG VDWLVIDFWRU\ VROXWLRQV WR WKH EDQNLQJ DQG HXUR
zone crisis which is placing an enormous strain on national economies, the 
euro zone and European integration as a whole. However, it is submitted that 
ignoring the future development of the European Social Model is a very short-
sighted strategy. In an enlarged European Union of 27 member states with very 
diverse social protection levels, economic integration needs to be coupled with 
a certain level of social integration in order to further European integration. For 
a long time the European Court of J ustice acted as a driver of European social 
integration. However, its recent decisions in the Viking and Laval cases have 
OHGWRDGLI¿FXOWLQWHUIDFHEHWZHHQ(8IUHHPRYHPHQWODZDQGQDWLRQDOODERXU
regulation. The judgments have wide-reaching implications for national social 
models and action is needed at an EU level to clarify the judgments and their 
scope within the European Social Model. However, the EU seems to be reluctant 
to take action in the social sphere, despite such action being necessary to counter 
the effects of the economic crisis. The impression is thereby given that the EU is 
at a loss as to the nature and extent of its social identity and how that identity is 
going to develop. 
European enlargement and the economic crisis: impact and lasting efects
 WP 2013.01 17
4. The economic crisis and the  
 consequences of European 
 enlargement
The lack of initiative at a European level when it comes to social policy is 
particularly regrettable in light of some of the lasting effects of the recent 
European enlargements. Despite the imposition of transitional measures 
restricting the free movement of workers in most member states following 
the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, unprecedented numbers of workers availed 
themselves of the right to free movement under the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union in order to move to another member state. Approximately 
70% of migrants from the new member states that acceded in 2004 travelled to 
the UK and Ireland, and by the end of 2007 such immigrants made up about 1% 
of the population of the UK (European Integration Consortium 2009). Since the 
start of the economic crisis, some migrants have left the UK and it was assumed 
that more would continue to do so if the economy failed to improve. However, 
a Polish expert on migration disputes this, saying that Polish research indicates 
the contrary (BBC News 2010). Statistical evidence from a study carried out 
in 2011 also indicates that few new member state workers from the 2004 
accession have left the UK (Holland et al. 2011). Even for a ‘classic’ country 
of immigration such as the UK, this development which has been descried as 
‘almost certainly the largest single wave of in-migration […] ever experienced’ 
+RPH2I¿FH has had noticeable effects. There have been a number of 
widely publicised industrial disputes centering on the use of EU workers instead 
of British workers. The ‘British J obs for British workers’ dispute provided the 
catalyst to a wave of ‘protests against the employment of workers from other 
EU member states on engineering construction projects’ (Ryan 2011: 73). In 
-DQXDU\  ZRUNHUV DW /LQGVH\ RLO UH¿QHU\ EHJDQ XQRI¿FLDO VWULNH DFWLRQ
in protest against perceived discrimination against British workers. The 
RZQHUVRIWKHUH¿QHU\KDGDZDUGHGFRQVWUXFWLRQRIDQHZXQLWDWWKHSODQWWR
an American company who had sub-contracted part of the work to an Italian 
FRPSDQ\:RUNHUVDW/LQGVH\RLOUH¿QHU\FRPPHQFHGXQRI¿FLDOVWULNHDFWLRQ
after learning that the sub-contractor would post its own permanent workforce 
RIIRUHLJQQDWLRQDOV,WDOLDQVWRWKHUH¿QHU\WRFRPSOHWHWKHSURMHFWUDWKHUWKDQ
employing British workers. This illustrates the feeling, as evidenced by many of 
the placards bearing the then Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s pledge of ‘British 
J obs for British Workers’, that British workers should be accorded preference 
over foreign nationals, in this case EU workers, in the allocation of employment 
contracts. The dispute generated a large amount of publicity and illustrated 
the resentment felt by members of the public about the process of European 
integration. However, other disputes soon followed, all of which resulted in the 
replacement of all or part of the EU workforce by local workers. 
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The occurrence of such anti-European sentiment following the enlargements 
ZDVQRWFRQ¿QHGWRWKH8.,Q*HUPDQ\GHVSLWHWKHLPSRVLWLRQRIWUDQVLWLRQDO
measures which were intended to restrict access to the labour market for new 
member state workers, allegations of wage dumping resulting in the loss of 
local jobs emerged in sectors like the German meat industry, where there was 
evidence that service providers from the new member states often paid their 
workers wages which were well below the rates paid to Germans (Czommer 
and Worthmann 2005). More recently, a German newspaper reported that the 
German national train company (Deutsche Bahn) was using workers from the 
new member states to clear stations and tracks of snow while paying them below 
the industry standard (Ritter 2010). Even though the transitional measures for 
those member states which joined the EU in 2004 were lifted in 2011 and the 
IHDUHG ODUJH LQÀX[RIQHZPHPEHUVWDWHZRUNHUVQHYHUPDWHULDOLVHG WKHUH LV
evidence that the enlargements have had a lasting effect on German national 
politics. This is most clearly enunciated in the debate surrounding the creation 
of a statutory minimum wage. Under its post-war industrial relations model, 
pay-rate agreements in Germany were negotiated across entire industries by 
the social partners and regulated pay for all employees. However, this system 
KDVEHJXQWRXQUDYHOIRUDQXPEHURIUHDVRQV¿UVWPDQ\HPSOR\HUVLQIRUPHU
East Germany are not members of the employers’ associations who negotiate 
the pay agreements, so that they do not feel bound by the terms and conditions; 
secondly, the increase in trade union mergers and the founding of small unions 
independent of the DGB have blurred the distinctions between industries; and, 
thirdly, a rival Christian trade union confederation has concluded lower pay 
DJUHHPHQWV WKDQ WKH '*% LQ VRPH ¿UPV $V D UHVXOW DSSUR[LPDWHO\  RI
workers in former West Germany are no longer covered by a pay-rate agreement 
and there was a fear that new member state workers would mainly work in areas 
not covered by a pay-rate agreement. 
7KHUH KDV EHHQ D ORQJVWDQGLQJ GHEDWH LQ *HUPDQ\ RYHU WKH EHQH¿WV DQG
disadvantages of a statutory minimum wage and this gained momentum and 
strong support from the trade unions in the run-up to the lifting of the transitional 
measures in 2011. A minimum wage was seen as a mechanism of defence to 
protect against social dumping by those workers from the new member states 
who could avail themselves of the free movement provisions under EU law from 
RQZDUGV*HUPDQWUDGHXQLRQVLQLWLDOO\KDGJUHDWGLI¿FXOW\LQVXSSRUWLQJ
the idea of a minimum wage as it implied that collective agreements were no 
ORQJHUVXI¿FLHQWWRUHJXODWHLQGXVWULDOUHODWLRQV,WDOVRPHDQWWKDWWUDGHXQLRQV
had to accept state involvement in the sphere of industrial relations, an area 
where regulation is usually left to the social partners and the courts. However, 
due to the decline in trade union strength through falling membership numbers 
and the increase in industries that are not covered by a collective agreement, the 
trade unions have come to recognise the importance of a statutory minimum 
wage. The debate surrounding the introduction of a minimum wage is ongoing as 
the political parties and the social partners cannot agree on the form and rate of 
the wage. However, there have been calls on the government by representatives 
of the federal states in the Upper House of Parliament to introduce a legislative 
proposal as soon as possible and it is likely that the debate will intensify in 
European enlargement and the economic crisis: impact and lasting efects
 WP 2013.01 19
the run-up to national elections in 2013. Trade unions certainly expect the 
introduction of a minimum wage either before or after the next elections.
The ECJ ’s judgments in Viking and particularly Laval provide the legal backdrop 
for the fears that EU workers may be used to undercut the local workforce. There 
have been repeated calls since 2008 for the European Commission to consider 
revising the Posted Workers’ Directive. After consultation on the problems of 
implementation of the Directive, the Commission issued a roadmap in 2010  
with a view to proposing a legislative initiative to deal with the consequences 
of the ECJ ’s case law in the fourth quarter of 2011. At the time of writing, the 
Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council was due to 
hear the Commission’s initial proposal on 17th February 2012. Little has been 
done in the meantime at a European level to calm fears over social dumping in 
a post-enlargement EU. On the contrary, the Swedish Labour Court’s decision 
in Laval added to the uncertainty over the interpretation of the Posted Workers’ 
Directive. Of course, one must bear in mind that the authority of the Labour 
Court’s judgment is restricted to the territory of Sweden. Its adventurous view 
of the liability of private persons for breaches of EU law is not binding across 
the European Union. Nonetheless, the judgment has the potential to create 
problems for trade unions taking collective action in violation of EU law. 
The trade union, in taking collective action in Laval, had acted in conformity 
with Swedish Law. Indeed, the Labour Court, before referring questions to the 
ECJ  in September 2005, had, in December 2004, dismissed Laval’s application 
for an interim order requiring that the collective action be brought to an end. 
Moreover, the Labour Court explicitly recognised in its judgment that there was 
no provision for the imposition of liability under national law. Nonetheless, 
once the trade union’s actions were later found to be contrary to EU law, the 
Labour Court established wide-reaching liability and even suggested that the 
trade unions should have considered whether their actions were compatible with 
EU law. Such an interpretation is highly problematic and could have serious 
consequences for industrial relations throughout the EU if trade unions can no 
longer rely on the protection from legal action by ensuring that collective action 
is in accordance with national laws. Moreover, this threat to collective action 
undermines collective bargaining as a whole, as the ability to take collective 
action is a necessary prerequisite for collective bargaining to function effectively. 
This was recognised by the European Court of Human Rights in its recent case 
law1 and it is regrettable that the Labour Court ignored such concerns.
1.   See Dem ir and Baykara v. Turkey  (Application No. 34503/ 97) and Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v. 
Turkey  (Application No. 68959/ 01).
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5. Conclusion
The ongoing economic crisis is increasing tensions across the European Union 
between member states over austerity packages and is exacerbating inequalities 
between workers. As Vaughan-Whitehead (2011: 52) explains, ‘the increasing 
movements of labour, capital and trade in the enlarged EU […] [create] new 
situations of wage competition, as illustrated by the Laval case and other cases 
brought before the European Court of J ustice.’ He (2011: 52) opines that ‘these 
pressures will continue to increase’. The danger is that these pressures which 
result in, for example, allegations of social dumping by new member state workers, 
OHDYHSHRSOHLQGRXEWDERXWWKHEHQH¿WVRIIXUWKHU(XURSHDQLQWHJUDWLRQIROORZLQJ
the European enlargements. This in turn threatens the very existence of the 
European Social Model. Unfortunately, the economic crisis seems to dominate 
so much of the debate at a European level that necessary social initiatives needed 
to manage the lasting effects of the European enlargements, such as the revision 
of the Posted Workers’ Directive, have been pushed to one side. However, 
Vaughan-Whitehead (2011: 54) argues that, for example, ‘the European social 
dialogue at EU level should […] be further strengthened, especially in periods 
of crisis, precisely to encourage better coordination and interaction of national 
responses.’ Based on this argument, an active European social policy could not 
only contribute to resolving tensions following the European enlargements but 
could also relieve the pressures of the economic downturn. Such a policy should 
not therefore be ignored. 
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